I missed Friday's release, so as pennance here's today's release of testimony transcripts of Laura Cooper (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense) and Catherine Croft and Christopher Anderson ( advisors to Ambassador Kurt Volker on Ukraine policy). As always, here's the notable excerpts:
Laura Cooper:
Providing critical security assistance to Ukraine serves U.S. national security in order to “deter Russian aggression elsewhere around the world.” (Page 16-17)
The Department of Defense (DOD) was “concerned” that delaying security assistance to Ukraine would weaken “a strategic partner” and make it “much more difficult for them to negotiate a peace on terms that are good for Ukraine.” (Page 95-96)
The Department of Defense, in coordination with the interagency, certified in May 2019 that Ukraine met the anti-corruption benchmarks set by the Pentagon to make it eligible to receive security assistance. (Page 24-25, 26-27, 34)
OMB informed the Department of Defense and other agencies during a meeting in July that the “funds were held without explanation,” and the Pentagon “did not get clarification.” (Page 44-45, 48-49, 49-50)
At a meeting on July 23, 2019, OMB told agencies that “the White House chief of staff has conveyed that the President has concerns about Ukraine and Ukraine security assistance,” and “immediately deputies began to raise concerns about how this could be done in a legal fashion.” (Page 50-52)
“All of the senior leaders of the U.S. national security departments and agencies were all unified in their—in their view that this assistance was essential.” (Page 58-59)
After President Trump froze the security assistance, the Department of Defense did not conduct an additional assessment of Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts because “DOD participants affirmed that we believed sufficient progress has been made.” (Page 102-104)
During an inter-agency meeting on July 31, 2019, “there were many affirmative statements that the Congress has appropriated this, we need to obligate it,” and the Department of Defense explained the only legal options to withhold the funds were a presidential “rescission notice” to Congress or a “reprogramming action.” (Page 56-57, 87-88, 127)
In August 2019, the Department of Defense assessed that the President’s freeze on security assistance to Ukraine put at risk “well over $100 million.” (Page 88-90, 90)
On August 20, 2019, Ambassador Kurt Volker was engaged in “an effort to see if there was a statement that the government of Ukraine could make” in order to lift President Trump’s hold on the security assistance. (Page 68-69)
Based on her conversations with Ambassador Volker and Ambassador Bill Taylor, Ms. Cooper understood that Ukrainian officials were aware that the security assistance had been frozen as of August 2019—before that fact was publicly reported. (Page 72-73, 79-80)
Catherine Croft:
In May 2019, Ms. Croft discussed with Ambassador Bill Taylor her concerns that if “Biden was going to be a credible rival for” President Trump, “that might push him to change the policy on Ukraine.” (Page 46-47, 48-49)
Ms. Croft was “trepidatious” about accepting a position as a special assistant to Ambassador Kurt Volker because “it was possible that the Trump administration would choose to change its policy to suit domestic politics.” (Page 44-45)
In speaking with Ambassador Kurt Volker about Rudy Giuliani, Ms. Croft “thanked him for keeping me out of that mess.” (Page 70, 120)
Ukrainian officials raised concerns about the hold on security assistance “very early on.” (Page 97-98, 86-87, 100-101)
OMB placed a separate, earlier hold on Javelin missiles because Mick Mulvaney was concerned that “Russia would react negatively to the provision of Javelins to Ukraine,” despite the fact that “all of the other policy agencies were in support.” (Page 26-27, 51-52)
The hold was later lifted after NSC officials briefed Mr. Mulvaney that “the agencies were in agreement about the policy moving forward.” (Page 28-29)
When serving at the NSC, Ms. Croft “received multiple calls from lobbyist Robert Livingston who told me that Ambassador Yovanovitch should be fired.” (Page 14-15)
"During my time at the NSC, I received multiple calls from lobbyist Robert Livingston who told me that Ambassador Yovanovitch should be fired. He characterized Ambassador Yovanovitch as a, quote, “Obama holdover,” end quote, and associated with George Soros. It was not clear to me at the time, or now, at whose direction or at whose expense Mr. Livingston was seeking the removal of Ambassador Yovanovitch. I documented these calls and told my boss, Fiona Hill, and George Kent, who was in Kyiv at the time, I am not aware of any action that was taken in response."
Christopher Anderson:
In March 2019, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine “was trying to keep his job by making himself useful” to “Giuliani and others” by “trying to play into U.S. domestic politics and thereby win favors.” (Page 43-44)
In late spring 2019, Ambassador Volker said he “had been in touch” with Rudy Giuliani, “that he did not think this issue was going away,” and that “we’d have to do something to change the narrative.” (Page 48-49, 96-97)
After the U.S. delegation attended President Zelensky’s inauguration, Ambassador Sondland arranged a White House meeting within three days because he “had connections to the White House and was taken more seriously than the State Department bureaucracy.” (Page 53-54)
During a meeting on May 23, 2019, in the Oval Office, “the President said something to the effect of the Ukrainians tried to take me down.” (Page 57)
On June 13, 2019, National Security Advisor John Bolton warned “that Mr. Giuliani was a key voice with the President on Ukraine” and that “every time Ukraine is mentioned, Giuliani pops up and that the President was listening to Giuliani about Ukraine.” (Page 15-16, 101)
After a meeting at the Department of Energy on June 18, 2019, Mr. Anderson and Ambassador Taylor discussed that “it was important not to talk about—not to push for individual investigations.” (Page 103-104, 112-113)
Mr. Anderson had “the fear that if Giuliani’s narrative took hold, that the Ukrainian Government was an enemy of the President,” that narrative would undermine the U.S. government’s efforts to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict in the Donbas. (Page 47)
Ambassador Bill Taylor “repeatedly expressed his concern that Giuliani would make his job difficult” and requested assurances from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that “our policy for Ukraine would not change.” (Page 60)
After Russia seized Ukrainian military vessels in the Sea of Azov on November 25, 2018, the State Department quickly prepared a statement for the White House condemning the Russian escalation—but President Trump “put an embargo on any statements,” and “there was never a statement from the White House.” (Page 14, 30-32)